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POV No. 027

How to defend the threshold of NATO? First, find it

A riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. That is how Winston Churchill, as a typical westerner, described Russia and its "mysterious soul".

How to defend the threshold of NATO? First, find it
A Ukrainian soldier gestures at a camouflaged frontline dugout.Photo: Vytautas Bruveris

The Riddle Nobody Wants to Solve

A riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. That is how Winston Churchill, as a typical westerner, described Russia and its "mysterious soul".

It seems, that this line today can be used to describe at least two no less important things. One is so called peace negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and US, another — article 5 of NATO.

Actually, this phrase is even more applicable to these two things, that to original object Churchill referred to. Especially, if we're talking about todays Russia. Mafia and former KGB junta, wrapped in the wannabe empire, inside the former global power — that's all of a riddle, a mystery and an enigma.

Refusal, fear and reluctance to face this reality in its brutal simplicity and to act accordingly, trying to mystify it in order to "legitimize" this refusal or "rationalize" along the lines of Western mentality — one of the main, if not the main, faultlines of the Western world.

But we have to admit, that the riddle and mystery of the "peace negotiations" in Moscow and Kyiv are much more enigmatic, than the nature of the current Russian state.

What Were They Talking About?

"So, what the heck they were talking about for hours?", — that is how we could sum up all the reactions, reflections, comments and analysis on the trip the Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff tandem had to Moscow and Kyiv.

Yeah, that peanut is looking almost impossible to crack. Everyone is absolutely right — there are almost zero to none new circumstances and factors, that could have the potential to break the deadlock. At least — such circumstances and factors, which could be detected from outside and seen in public.

Russian regime and its master Vladimir Putin are still hellbent to achieve not only the "goal minimum", but also the "goal maximum". The first one is capitulation of Ukraine, withdrawing from the Donetsk oblast with the last Ukrainian strongholds there and the parts of Zaporizhia and Cherson oblasts, which are also still not captured by Russia. Then there are other Russian ultimatums about "Russian language rights" and "denazification".

But this is only the short stop towards the main goal — either capturing or destroying and making unlivable the majority of Ukrainian territory, thus destroying the state and the country.

Ukraine, from its part, is refusing to accept Russian "goal minimum", not to mention the "goal maximum".

The whole situation fundamentally remains the same, like it was since the year 2014 — the independent and sovereign from Russia Ukrainian state is existentially unacceptable for Russian regime in any territorial shape, just because of the fact of its existence. So, for the Ukrainian state there's only one existential option without any other options — to fight and resist.

The mere survival and fending off Russian onslaught on the ground and in the air, exhausting Russia to the point, when it admits, that it is no longer able to achieve the "goal maximum".

That would be Ukrainian "victory minimum", which might lead to the "victory maximum" — real stopping of the war and erosion of the Russian regime. The latter is the one and only option for real end of this war — as it always was since the year 2014.

It is just physically, existentially impossible to have any kind of "compromise" here — not to mention some "win-win solution", which Mr. Kushner was speculating on in Kyiv.

There just can be "win-win" solutions. The very fact, that Ukraine agreed on the unconditional and immediate ceasefire along existing frontlines is the fundamental concession from its part, agreeing with the violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to all existing constitutional principles — and not only Ukrainian ones — the highest authorities of any country have no right to do this. On the contrary, they have the constitutional obligation to try to force the occupiers out by any means, including the military ones.

So, the only caveat there is kind of "Finnish" one — to agree with "freezing" the fire and the war on the factual line, because the other option would be ever growing losses for the country and the threat to lose everything. This is current position of Ukraine and its president Volodymyr Zelensky, despite all their strategic communications, that Ukraine has "turned the tide" and even started "winning the war".

And last, but not least. Russian regime and Putin himself just cannot start even thinking about any kind of negotiations and diplomacy without "minimum of minimum" — capturing all Donetsk oblast. There's less than zero possibility, that some glimmer of diplomacy from Russian side emerges until this goal is reached.

Of course, there will be no glimmer of it, if it is reached. Anyway, president Zelensky obviously meant exactly this, when he hinted that Donetsk-Donbass issue is still central on the tactical-operative level of "negotiations". That means that Russians are still demanding Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donetsk oblast "for the start". And, as always, Ukraine is refusing to do this.

So, according to president Zelensky, the war "most probably" will last through the upcoming winter — at least.

Overall plot of the Kushner-Witkoff trip, most probably, looked like this — in Moscow they listened and recorded Putin’s rants about the overwhelming and accelerating pace of his army on the ground and crumbling Ukraine's army, which is nearing the collapse. Even more probably, Putin was raising even much bigger territorial and political demands for the pause of the war, than earlier.

In Kyiv the duo voiced these to Zelensky and his team and heard the same "no". That is how this simple story ended.

Russia reiterated, that it continues the effort to "achieve the main goals" on the battlefield.

Now it is bragging, that "the victory" is near and the days of "Kiev regime are numbered.

And, of course, there was the phone conversation between Putin and Trump, which, according to both sides, was very "constructive".

Where the New Ideas Come From

US street detour signs ('Follow 15th St. Detour')
Road-work detour signs on a Washington, D.C. street beside a US flag.Vytautas Bruveris

Then what "new ideas", which were praised by all sides, could have been brought into this process by American duo? Where widespread feeling, that this time things can be more "serious" and "real", than always, comes from and how much it can be grounded in the reality?

Needless to say that all the mountains of gold, which Trump, according to both sides, promised Putin — again — if the latter will agree to stop the war are just for the birds. This is meant to distract public attention from the real issues, which remain inside an enigma.

First of all, it is obvious, that both Ukraine and Russia are in the worst shape, than, let's say, when Russia proclaimed, that it is "withdrawing" from the "negotiations process".

So, the Americans may be counting on that the fighting sides — first of all Ukraine — might be more "cooperative".

Second, the US midterms are nearing and thus soon there will be no time and window of opportunity for any other process, than the elections.

On the one hand, dominant approach, that the US elections might be main driver of US efforts to revive negotiations isn't looking very convincing.

Actually, it is absolutely not clear, if situation in and with Ukraine is factor Trump and his base care more, than little.

In general, these elections might turn into absolute upheaval and political chaos if Trump won't admit their results in case of defeat. If such case, nobody in US will care about situation in and with Ukraine more, than little.

But on the other hand, US and Trump administration are also in the worst shape, than earlier — first of all, they are severely battered by Iran war and its failure.

That is why they might ask the Russian help or cooperation in that front.

One New Idea: Pressure Kyiv

All in all, everything boils down to one and only "new idea" — new and more harsh American and Russian pressure on Ukraine and Zelensky personally to give in — first of all, on Donbas issue.

What are the new cards and tools to increase this pressure? Of course, first of all, this is the issue of American intelligence sharing with Ukraine — one of the last, but absolutely critical for Ukraine tool still left in almost empty American made toolbox.

It is beyond doubt, that the Russians are raising this issue in every meeting with American "partners" — for example, it must have been one of the main topics of conversations with the head of the CIA John Ratcliffe during his recent visit to Moscow.

Another possible issue — Zelensky himself. Essential goal of Russians — to remove him. Either politically — that is what the "elections" issue is all about, or physically — if all other "means" are exhausted.

What is still keeping Russia from this "last resort"? Apparently, that is not only some mutual deal with the Russians not to cross this one of the last red lines, but also the personal security guarantees by the Americans.

So, are these topics among the "new ideas" or, more precisely, blackmail among those "harsh conditions", which Trump's "envoys" brought to Kyiv from Moscow?

As said, it is very probable. If not now, then it is only the matter of time, when Americans in the name of Russians and behalf of them will start blackmailing Ukraine with such issues.

It is simple as that — current US administration sees precisely Ukraine as the one, which is to be pressured in order to cut this Gordian knot and to break out of the deadlock.

Then what?

That is the question to Europe, which is still trying somehow to find its place in these "negotiations", but still failing miserably.

Why?

One of the reasons — it even can't find, where the threshold of NATO article 5 lies and what is its height.

Leipzig and the Missing Threshold

In what other way we can describe Germany's actions after its own claim that failed terrorist attack in Leipzig airport was organized by Russian state?

Once again and slowly. Russian state actors. Organized the attack, which could have led to numerous deaths and damage. In Germany. Against Germany.

If it is not NATO article 5, what is it?

Ok, you can still call it "hybrid", meaning, that Russia still didn't want to be fully exposed and step out into the full display.

And now Russians, of course, fiercely deny their involvement, calling the very attribution of the attack to them "the act of war". They are already seeing, that Germany de facto has declared the war on them.

But NATO article 4 would be, so to say, the thing, that would have matched the situation, right?

No, Germany's leadership didn't see this like that.

The same goes to the concrete actions of the reaction, which were taken by the German state.

Closing consulate and Russian center of culture-espionage, enforcing the border control for Russians and things like that, of course, is better, than nothing, but no more than that.

Of course, Germany can't mirror Russia's actions and, for example, organize terrorist attack in, let's say, some Moscow airport. Nobody's even talking about this.

But the actions against so called Russian shadow fleet, targeted to real disruption of this business, ignition of the new sectoral sanctions against the Russian economy, but most of all — new breakthrough in military aid to Ukraine — that is what it is appropriate as the lowest possible level of retaliation.

The immediate counter argument to that criticism was — you have to leave some "escalation reserve" and "space" for the next possible stage of escalation and in order to keep the adversary guessing , what is left in your pocket and armory.

But such argumentation is looking no less weak, than this "controlled escalation" itself. Actually, it was just the fig leaf to cover the absence of the real escalation strategy, when it is already known not only how to retaliate in response, but also how to turn the tide of the confrontation, turning from defence to offense.

Russian take of leaving "the space for next escalation" and "strategic ambiguity" is plain and simple — we are afraid and just don't know what to do.

We, very likely, would be lost in the same way even if Russians take the last resort before the nuclear option" action — full scale ground invasion into some NATO country or countries territory.

And Russians are essentially right.

This is not and never was only or mainly the Germans problem. That's European problem, meaning Europe as a whole and a separate countries.

If it is not NATO article 5, what is it?


Vilnius Cannot Find It Either

Eagle-topped flag in a US marble hall
A gilded eagle finial atop a flagpole in a classical marble hall of a U.S. institution.Vytautas Bruveris

One can take a look to, let's say, Lithuania.

Here's the quote from recent interview to the national broadcaster of the main adviser of Lithuanian president Gitanas Nausėda on national security and defense Deividas Matulionis:

Journalist: But, Mr. Matulionis, has the Alliance actually defined where that red line lies — where the Article 5 threshold is, or where that "first centimeter" is at which the Alliance initiates collective defense? How many power plants must be blown up, how many railway tracks dismantled, or how many civilians killed before the Alliance shifts from a police-style response to collective defense mechanisms?

Matulionis: that boundary is certainly very unclear. I believe that if serious damage were inflicted on critical infrastructure, or if there were casualties, the affected countries would request the invocation of Article 5; consequently, the readiness levels of all our armed forces would be raised, additional measures regarding critical infrastructure protection would be implemented, and perhaps extra measures would be applied at the borders.

For the time being, the countries do not consider current events grounds for invoking Article 5, and it is difficult to say exactly when it would be triggered. However, it is obvious that in the event of a direct military incursion — even on a limited scale — that would indeed constitute an Article 5 scenario; the affected country would make a request, and there is no doubt that Article 5 would be invoked immediately and automatically under the Washington Treaty.

Journalist: Would that article be automatically invoked if, for example, one or more NATO soldiers were killed? Or is that not necessarily the case, given that a long and thorough investigation would be required?

Matulionis: Well, it is difficult for me to say. I think it would depend, again, on the decision of the country being affected. The first step — if it were Lithuania in this instance — would be for Lithuania to appeal to the NATO Secretary General; a meeting of the North Atlantic Council would be urgently convened, and a decision would be reached. However, there is the aspect of fear of escalation, which we cannot ignore. In this case, it is hard for me to say; it is more of a theoretical question.

What we clearly see and hear here from the top presidential aide, who, by the way, earlier was ambassador of Lithuania to NATO?

It is the strategic confusion, which dwells and prevails not only in Vilnius top cabinets, but also in heights and peaks of the NATO itself and its main member states.

First of all, these are European members, because one of the main reasons of this confusion is unpredictability of US in this context.

But the same about the unpredictability even if Russians are openly and, so to say, conventionally attacking some of the NATO border state(s) can be attributed also to some European members.

At least, this also is what the sources of "Arch Frontline" among former and current Lithuanian and international diplomats are saying informally.

Well, we have to say that German government kind of started reacting at criticism of its primary reaction — it announced substantial packages of military and financial aid to Ukraine, including existentially needed air defences. Also, top German officials announced big offensive actions against Russian shadow fleet, initiation of new wave of European sanctions on Russia.

Similar things were echoed by leadership of European Union.

That's, of course, good, better later, than never, so to say.

What Is the Endgame?

But the core problem, which is, actually, mother of all problems, remains the same — absence of not only strategic vision of the escalation ladder, but the main goal towards Russian dictatorship itself.

In other words — what is the master plan and the endgame? Do we — the West-Europe — want Putin to fall and this regime to collapse and act accordingly to that goal? Or do we still keep hoping, that dust somehow will settle at the end of the day?

No, it won't. What will happen instead? It remains the riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.


Vytautas Bruveris
Editor

Vytautas Bruveris is a Lithuanian journalist and analyst focused on Russia, Ukraine, and the geopolitics of the eastern flank. He conducts in-depth interviews with policymakers, military analysts, and foreign policy experts across Europe and beyond.