Trump has put global political strategies through one ordeal after another. The first came in 2016, when America’s traditional allies were given their first hint that their plans were no longer resting on solid ground — or even on water, but on the shifting winds. The world’s most powerful country had placed its foreign policy in the hands of a chaotic ignoramus with delusions of grandeur and an absolute conviction that he could do no wrong. Over time, he made it clear to America’s allies that he had no intention of consulting them, even on decisions of major importance to the international community. What he expected in return was unquestioning obedience and maximum compliance with his demands.

This was so far removed from the established order that people simply did not want to believe it was possible. Much like the idea that rational negotiations with Putin might be impossible, come to think of it. But after Trump’s second coming, the presidents and prime ministers of leading powers were eventually forced to accept that Washington effectively regarded them as little more than unreliable, disposable messengers of the White House occupant’s policy. A policy, incidentally, that had never even been properly institutionalized: instead, it had simply been written into official doctrines in the form of a handful of archaic populist slogans.

Serious, well-founded political strategies are built on reliable calculations. Trump has done away with every kind of certainty except one: his own. He is absolutely convinced that every decision he makes is flawless and bound to succeed, while everyone else is apparently there only to mess up his lawn.

But once Trump had thrown the old strategies into the trash, those hit by the political upheaval had no choice but to come up with new ones — including strategies that took Trump himself into account.

Ukraine was naturally among the countries affected. And when Trump began his second term in January 2025, that vulnerability turned into an unavoidable reality. In the middle of the most devastating war in its modern history, Kyiv had to rethink its approach to dealing with what had once been its biggest ally. It had to start from a clear understanding: this was an ally that had become conspicuously former — and the situation was likely to last. If Ukraine was lucky, it would last two years, until the next midterm elections.

The midterm results turned out to be something that would have looked like pure fantasy just a few months earlier: Democrats won control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Republican administration remains in the White House, but it now has to deal with a Congress in which the opposition controls both chambers, the key budget committees, and a substantial share of the tools of congressional oversight.

For the first time in Trump’s second term, his ambitions are facing a substantial institutional counterweight. And this time it is not just a handful of Republican rebels in Congress, but a full-fledged Democratic majority in both chambers. For Ukraine, this promises more than a simple change in Washington’s party balance.

But what exactly has changed, and what can Ukraine realistically do with this opportunity? After all, Ukraine was hardly the decisive issue in the election. Democrats did not win because American voters suddenly decided that the United States should take responsibility for securing Ukraine’s victory.

Still, the campaign brought out a clear difference between the parties in their attitudes toward Russian aggression. According to the Back Both Now project, 295 of the 481 Democratic candidates had an identifiable position in support of Ukraine. Among 466 Republican candidates, the number was just 52. Of course, a substantial share of candidates had simply never stated a public position. But it is telling that some considered it important to do so.

Contrary to Trump’s public rhetoric, the Grand Old Party still has a group of politicians willing to support Ukraine, even if their reasoning differs from that of Democrats. Republicans tend to talk less about solidarity with a victim of aggression and more about American interests: containing Russia, protecting NATO, preserving US influence in Europe, and preventing Moscow from expanding its military and political capabilities.

There is also another part of the Republican political landscape for which the priority is not so much Russia’s defeat as a reduction in America’s commitments abroad. Mike Beltran, a Republican candidate in Florida who lost to Kathy Castor, is a case in point. He said openly that he was not prepared to send more money to Ukraine, but was willing to discuss selling it American weapons. This is not a rejection of cooperation, but it is a very different model of relations: Ukraine may be able to count on American products, but it should not expect the United States to assume any responsibility for the situation.

There are examples pointing in the opposite direction, too. Democrat Rebecca Bennett, who defeated Republican Tom Kean Jr. in New Jersey, publicly supported Ukraine. Kathy Castor, who held on to her seat in the House, voted for the Ukraine Support Act. And let me remind you that when the House voted on the bill in June, it was not just Democrats who supported it: eighteen Republican representatives voted in favor as well.

This is not a return to the old bipartisan consensus, of course. But neither is it a situation in which support for Ukraine depends entirely on the position of a single party.

And that is precisely the distinction Kyiv will have to build its strategy around in dealing with Washington.

First, there is now a real opportunity to move American support away from personal arrangements with the occupant of the White House and toward formal US legislative and institutional commitments.

Under Trump’s increasingly personal rule, Washington’s policy toward Ukraine has depended to a large extent on the executive branch. The administration has delayed deliveries on a whim, changed priorities, revised the volume of assistance, and used it as leverage over Kyiv. Even when Congress approved funding, that did not guarantee the White House would use the money as lawmakers had intended.

Now the situation is changing. Democrats will take control of the budget committees in both chambers, giving them a direct say in the allocation of funds for defense and international assistance. They will be able to push for stable funding for existing programs, attach specific conditions to the use of funds, and demand accountability from the administration.

This does not mean, of course, that Democrats can simply vote for another aid package and force Trump to sign it. A presidential veto is still a presidential veto, and overriding one still requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers — a number the new majority does not have. Worse still, the Senate has its own procedural constraints, including the possibility of the minority blocking legislation through a filibuster.

But Congress can work to keep already approved programs going, block attempts to dismantle them unilaterally, impose reporting requirements, and create legislative safeguards against arbitrary changes in administration policy. This is not absolute protection against presidential overreach, but it does add another layer of institutional resilience.

Another area is sanctions policy. Here, the new Congress could have some particularly interesting options.

The problem with American sanctions is not just which restrictions have been imposed, but how consistently the Trump administration is prepared to enforce them. Lawmakers can impose sanctions, but their practical effectiveness depends to a large extent on the executive branch: investigations, export controls, pressure on intermediaries, the work of financial regulators, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement.

The new Congress could make any attempt by the White House to evade these responsibilities a matter of sustained congressional scrutiny. And that should apply not only to new sanctions, but also to existing ones targeting Russia’s energy sector, shadow fleet, financial intermediaries, and companies helping the Russian military-industrial complex obtain Western technology.

For Ukraine, it is crucial that sanctions stop being bargaining chips in Trump’s “fantastic deals” with Putin. Any lifting of restrictions should depend on concrete Russian actions, not on how well the latest leaders’ meeting went or what Fox News has to say about the outcome.

The third area is congressional oversight of the administration itself. Democrats will have the opportunity to conduct investigations, demand documents, summon officials to hearings, and publicly examine how foreign policy decisions are made. Ukraine could be a significant part of that process.

What exactly has the US administration been discussing with Moscow? Have economic benefits been offered to Russia in exchange for something unrelated to Ukraine’s security guarantees? Who made the decisions to suspend weapons deliveries, and on what grounds? What was the rationale behind restricting military cooperation? Is there a conflict between US national interests and the commercial interests of particular companies and individuals with access to the White House?

The very possibility of congressional scrutiny can significantly change the administration’s way of operating. When officials have to explain their decisions not only to the president but also to congressional committees, the room for opaque policymaking shrinks considerably.

Of course, Democratic control of Congress is not the same as control over US foreign policy. Investigations may create political problems for the administration, but they will not necessarily produce immediate practical results. Trump can ignore criticism, use his presidential powers, veto legislation, and continue pursuing his own agenda within the authority of the executive branch.

This brings us to the fourth area, which may be even more important than the first three.

Kyiv needs to build military-industrial cooperation with the United States on a scale that makes American interest in Ukraine’s defense capability about more than just congressional appropriations.

During the war, Ukraine has become a developer and manufacturer of distinctive weapons systems, particularly drones, electronic warfare equipment, and technologies for countering aerial attacks. It is no longer just a country asking its partners for weapons. It is a country with its own technological solutions and practical experience of using them in a high-intensity war.

For the American defense industry, this kind of cooperation already makes considerable practical sense. Joint production, technology sharing, the integration of Ukrainian developments into US defense programs, and the involvement of Ukrainian companies in supply chains — all of this can create American jobs, serve commercial interests, and deliver technological advantages.

Support for Ukraine then stops looking exclusively like an item of US budget expenditure. It becomes an integral part of American industrial and defense policy, and even a significant factor in military security.

Of course, Ukraine cannot afford to wait for defense companies to agree on cooperation plans. It needs air defense missiles right now. But mutually beneficial cooperation will, in one way or another, make support more sustainable and less vulnerable to somebody’s political whims.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that midterm elections do not mark the end of a political cycle. They mark the beginning of the run-up to the 2028 presidential election.

Trump and his administration have brought about a situation in which Democrats now dominate both chambers of Congress, and the Republican Party will inevitably have to reassess his political legacy. That means Ukraine needs to start working now not only with members of Congress, governors, think tanks, and influential groups in both parties, but also with those who might become presidential candidates. In this situation, Kyiv’s prolonged inability — or unwillingness — to appoint a new ambassador in Washington is simply dangerous.

Ukraine must be part of the American political debate not only as a response to yet another crisis in bilateral relations. It needs to be part of the discussion about America’s future security, the US role in Europe, and relations with Russia.

At the same time, Ukraine must avoid becoming a participant in America’s partisan warfare. Democrats may use the Ukraine issue as an argument against Trump; Republicans may use it as an excuse to accuse their opponents of trying to drag the United States into “somebody else’s war.” In either case, Ukraine risks becoming not a participant in the debate, but someone else’s political instrument.

Ukraine needs to maintain relations with Republicans who see Putin’s aggression as a threat to US interests, while making sure Democrats do not reduce support for Ukraine to just another weapon in their fight against Trump. Otherwise, the political gains could be wiped out after the next election.

Strictly speaking, this is Ukraine’s main task: not simply to take advantage of a temporary shift in the political climate, but to turn it into durable institutional mechanisms of support.

And this is where Donald Trump, the great destroyer of strategies, comes back into the picture. He sees institutions as obstacles to be eliminated, bypassed, or at least neutralized. Trump will remain in the Oval Office for another two years, and it would be naive to expect him simply to put up with the expansion of precisely the kind of institutional safeguards he dislikes so much. So, in the next confrontation between the White House and Congress, Ukraine could well become one of the points of contention.

The good news is that this threat is obvious enough for Ukraine to prepare a strategy to minimize its impact.

In the end, Ukraine’s task is not to make Trump fall in love with it. That, to put it mildly, does not look like a particularly promising investment. But lying low and waiting for the next president is not an option either. Russia’s aggression is continuing, and Ukraine needs help right now.

What Ukraine needs is for American support to stop depending on the personal likes and dislikes of whoever happens to be president. It needs to be secured through legislation and budget decisions, bipartisan agreements, economic interests, and commitments made by its partners.

Ukraine needs American institutions that will stand firm and keep working even if the next occupant of the White House decides to run them over with a bulldozer.